;--

There are 4 object types used by the STIR/SHAKEN process...

The "attestation" object sets the parameters for creating an Identity
header which attests to the ownership of the caller id on outgoing
INVITE requests.

One or more "tn" objects that are used to create the outgoing Identity
header.  Each object's "id" is a specific caller-id telephone number
and the object contains the URL to the certificate that was used to
attest to the ownership of the caller-id, the level (A,B,C) of the
attestation you're making, and the private key the asterisk
attestation service will use to sign the Identity header.  When
an outgoing INVITE request is placed, the attestation service will
look up the caller-id in the tn object list and if it's found, use
the information in the object to create the Identity header.

The "verification" object sets the parameters for verification
of the Identity header and caller id on incoming INVITE requests.

One or more "profile" objects that can be associated to channel
driver endpoints (currently only chan_pjsip).  Profiles can set
whether verification, attestation, both or neither should be
performed on requests coming in to this endpoint or requests
going out from this endpoint. Additionally they can override
most of the attestation and verification options to make them
specific to an endpoint.  When Asterisk loads the configs, it
creates "effective profiles" or "eprofiles" on the fly that are
the amalgamation of the attestation, verification and profile.
You can see them in the CLI with "stir_shaken show eprofiles".

NOTE: The "tn" object can be configured to source its data from a
realtime database by configuring sorcery.conf and extconfig.conf.
Both of those files have examples for "stir_tn".  There is also an
Alembic script in the "config" section of contrib/ast-db-manage that
will create the table.  Since there can be only one "verification"
or "attestation" object, and will probably be only a few "profile"
objects, those objects aren't realtime enabled.

--;

;--
=======================================================================
  Attestation Object Description
=======================================================================
The "attestation" object sets the parameters for creating an Identity
header which attests to the ownership of the caller id on outgoing
INVITE requests.

All parameters except 'global_disable" may be overridden in a "profile"
or "tn" object.

Only one "attestation" object may exist.

Parameters:

-- global_disable -----------------------------------------------------
If set, globally disables the attestation service.  No Identity headers
will be added to any outgoing INVITE requests.

Default: no

-- private_key_file ---------------------------------------------------
The path to a file containing the private key you received from the
issuing authority.  The file must NOT be group or world readable or
writable so make sure the user the asterisk process is running as is
the owner.

Default: none

-- public_cert_url ----------------------------------------------------
The URL to the certificate you received from the issueing authority.
They may give you a URL to use or you may have to host the certificate
yourself and provide your own URL here.

Default: none

WARNING:  Make absolutely sure the file that's made public doesn't
accidentally include the privite key as well as the certificate.
If you set "check_tn_cert_public_url" in the "attestation" section
above, the tn will not be loaded and a "DANGER" message will be output
on the asterisk console if the file does contain a private key.

-- check_tn_cert_public_url -------------------------------------------
Identity headers in outgoing requests must contain a URL that points
to the certificate used to sign the header.  Setting this parameter
tells Asterisk to actually try to retrieve the certificates indicated
by "public_cert_url" parameters and fail loading that tn if the cert
can't be retrieved or if its 'Not Valid Before" -> 'Not Valid After"
date range doesn't include today.  This is a network intensive process
so use with caution.

Default: no

-- attest_level -------------------------------------------------------
The level of the attestation you're making.
One of "A", "B", "C"

Default: none

-- unknown_tn_attest_level --------------------------------------------
Attestation level to use for unknown TNs.
One of "A", "B", "C"

Normally if a callerid TN isn't configured in stir_shaken.conf
no Identity header will be created. If this option is set,
however, an Identity header will be sent using this
attestation level.  Since there's no TN object, you must
ensure that a private_key_file and public_cert_url are
configured in the attestation or profile objects for
this to work.

Default: none

-- send_mky -----------------------------------------------------------
If set and an outgoing call uses DTLS, an "mky" Media Key grant will
be added to the Identity header.  Although RFC8224/8225 require this,
not many implementations support it so a remote verification service
may fail to verify the signature.

Default: no

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Example "attestation" object:
--;

;[attestation]
;global_disable = no
;private_key_file = /var/lib/asterisk/keys/stir_shaken/tns/multi-tns-key.pem
;public_cert_url = https://example.com/tncerts/multi-tns-cert.pem
;attest_level = C
;unknown_tn_attest_level = C

;--
=======================================================================
  TN Object Description
=======================================================================
Each "tn" object contains the parameters needed to create the Identity
header used to attest to the ownership of the caller-id on outgoing
requests.  When an outgoing INVITE request is placed, the attestation
service will look up the caller-id in this list and if it's found, use
the information in the object to create the Identity header.
The private key and certificate needed to sign the Identity header are
usually provided to you by the telephone number issuing authority along
with their certificate authority certificate.  You should give the CA
certificate to any recipients who expect to receive calls from you
although this has probably already been done by the issuing authority.

The "id" of this object MUST be a canonicalized telephone number which
starts with a country code.  The only valid characters are the numbers
0-9, '#' and '*'.

Parameters:

-- type (required) ----------------------------------------------------
Must be set to "tn"

Default: none

-- private_key_file ---------------------------------------------------
The path to a file containing the private key you received from the
issuing authority.  The file must NOT be group or world readable or
writable so make sure the user the asterisk process is running as is
the owner.

Default: private_key_file from the profile or attestation objects.

-- public_cert_url ----------------------------------------------------
The URL to the certificate you received from the issueing authority.
They may give you a URL to use or you may have to host the certificate
yourself and provide your own URL here.

Default: public_cert_url from the profile or attestation objects.

WARNING:  Make absolutely sure the file that's made public doesn't
accidentally include the privite key as well as the certificate.
If you set "check_tn_cert_public_url" in the "attestation" section
above, the tn will not be loaded and a "DANGER" message will be output
on the asterisk console if the file does contain a private key.

-- attest_level -------------------------------------------------------
The level of the attestation you're making.
One of "A", "B", "C"

Default: attest_level from the profile or attestation objects.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Example "tn" object:
--;

;[18005551515]
;type = tn
;private_key_file = /var/lib/asterisk/keys/stir_shaken/tns/18005551515-key.pem
;public_cert_url = https://example.com/tncerts/18005551515-cert.pem
;attest_level = C

;--
=======================================================================
  Verification Object Description
=======================================================================
The "verification" object sets the parameters for verification
of the Identity header on incoming INVITE requests.

All parameters except 'global_disable" may be overridden in a "profile"
object.

Only one "verification" object may exist.

Parameters:

-- global_disable -----------------------------------------------------
If set, globally disables the verification service.

Default: no

-- load_system_certs---------------------------------------------------
If set, loads the system Certificate Authority certificates
(usually located in /etc/pki/CA) into the trust store used to
validate the certificates in incoming requests.  This is not
normally required as service providers will usually provide their
CA certififcate to you separately.

Default: no

-- ca_file -----------------------------------------------------------
Path to a file containing one or more CA certs in PEM format.
These certs are used to verify the chain of trust for the
certificate retrieved from the X5U Identity header parameter.  This
file must have the root CA certificate, the certificate of the
issuer of the X5U certificate, and any intermediate certificates
between them.

Default: none

-- ca_path -----------------------------------------------------------
Path to a directory containing one or more hashed CA certs.
See ca_file above.
For this option, each certificate must be placed in its own
PEM file in the directory specified and hashed with the
following command:
`openssl rehash <ca_path>`

Default: none

NOTE:  Both ca_file and ca_path can be specified but at least one
MUST be.

-- crl_file -----------------------------------------------------------
Path to a file containing one or more CRLs in PEM format.
If you with to check if the certificate in the X5U Identity header
parameter has been revoked, you'll need the certificate revocation
list generated by the issuer.

Default: none

-- crl_path -----------------------------------------------------------
Path to a directory containing one or more hashed CRLs.
See crl_file above.
For this option, each CRL must be placed in its own
PEM file in the directory specified and hashed with the
following command:
`openssl rehash <crl_path>`

Default: none

NOTE:  Neither crl_file nor crl_path are required.

-- untrusted_cert_file ------------------------------------------------
Path to a file containing one or more untrusted certs in PEM format.
Unfortunately, sometimes the CRLs are signed by a different CA
than the certificate being verified.  In this case, you'll need to
provide the certificate belonging to the issuer of the CRL.  That
certificate is considered "untrusted" by OpenSSL and can't be placed
in the ca_file or ca_path.  It has to be specified here.

Default: none

-- untrusted_cert_path ------------------------------------------------
Path to a directory containing one or more hashed untrusted certs used
to verify CRLs.
See untrusted_cert_file above.
For this option, each certificates must be placed in its own
PEM file in the directory specified and hashed with the
following command:
`openssl rehash <ca_path>`

Default: none

NOTE:  Neither untrusted_cert_file nor untrusted_cert_path are required
unless you're verifying CRLs that aren't signed by the same CA as the
X5U certificate.

-- cert_cache_dir -----------------------------------------------------
Incoming Identity headers will have a URL pointing to the certificate
used to sign the header.  To prevent us from having to retrieve the
certificate for every request, we maintain a cache of them in the
'cert_cache_dir' specified.  The directory will be checked for
existence and writability at startup.

Default: <astvarlibdir>/keys/stir_shaken/cache

-- curl_timeout -------------------------------------------------------
The number of seconds we'll wait for a response when trying to retrieve
the certificate specified in the incoming Identity header's "x5u"
parameter.

Default: 2

-- max_cache_entry_age ------------------------------------------------
Maximum age in seconds a certificate in the cache can reach before
re-retrieving it.

Default: 86400 (24 hours per ATIS-1000074)

NOTE: If, when retrieving the URL specified by the "x5u" parameter,
we receive a recognized caching directive in the HTTP response AND that
directive indicates caching for MORE than the value set here, we'll use
that time for the max_cache_entry_age.

-- max_cache_size -----------------------------------------------------
Maximum number of entries the cache can hold.
Not presently implemented.

-- max_iat_age --------------------------------------------------------
The "iat" parameter in the Identity header indicates the time the
sender actually created their attestation. If that is older than the
current time by the number of seconds set here, the request will be
considered "failed".

Default: 15

-- ignore_sip_date_header ---------------------------------------------
When set to true, will cause the verification process to not consider a
missing or invalid SIP "Date" header to be a failure.  This will make
the IAT the sole "truth" for Date in the verification process.

Default: no

-- max_date_header_age ------------------------------------------------
The sender MUST also send a SIP Date header in their request.  If we
receive one that is older than the current time by the number of seconds
set here, the request will be considered "failed".

Default: 15

-- failure_action -----------------------------------------------------
Indicates what will happen to requests that have failed verification.
Must be one of:
- continue -
  Continue processing the request.  You can use the STIR_SHAKEN
  dialplan function to determine whether the request passed or failed
  verification and take the action you deem appropriate.

- reject_request -
  Reject the request immediately using the SIP response codes
  defined by RFC8224.

- continue_return_reason -
  Continue processing the request but, per RFC8224, send a SIP Reason
  header back to the originator in the next provisional response
  indicating the issue according to RFC8224.  You can use the
  STIR_SHAKEN dialplan function to determine whether the request
  passed or failed verification and take the action you deem
  appropriate.

Default: continue

NOTE: If you select "continue" or "continue_return_reason", and,
based on the results from the STIR_SHAKEN function, you determine you
want to terminate the call, you can use the PJSIPHangup() dialplan
application to reject the call using a STIR/SHAKEN-specific SIP
response code.

-- use_rfc9410_responses ----------------------------------------------
If set, when sending Reason headers back to originators, the protocol
header parameter will be set to "STIR" rather than "SIP".  This is a
new protocol defined in RFC9410 and may not be supported by all
participants.

Default: no

-- relax_x5u_port_scheme_restrictions ---------------------------------
If set, the port and scheme restrictions imposed by ATIS-1000074
section 5.3.1 that require the scheme to be "https" and the port to
be 443 or 8443 are relaxed.  This will allow schemes like "http"
and ports other than the two mentioned to appear in x5u URLs received
in Identity headers.

Default: no

CAUTION: Setting this parameter could have serious security
implications and should only be use for testing.

-- relax_x5u_path_restrictions ----------------------------------------
If set, the path restrictions imposed by ATIS-1000074 section 5.3.1
that require the x5u URL to be rejected if it contains a query string,
path parameters, fragment identifier or user/password are relaxed.

Default: no

CAUTION: Setting this parameter could have serious security
implications and should only be use for testing.

-- x5u_permit/x5u_deny ------------------------------------------------
When set, the IP address of the host in a received Identity header x5u
URL is checked against the acl created by this list of permit/deny
parameters.  If the check fails, the x5u URL will be considered invalid
and verification will fail.  This can prevent an attacker from sending
you a request pretending to be a known originator with a mailcious
certificate URL. (Server-side request forgery (SSRF)).
See acl.conf.sample to see examples of how to specify the permit/deny
parameters.

Default:  Deny all "Special-Purpose" IP addresses described in RFC 6890.
This includes the loopback addresses 127.0.0.0/8, private use networks such
as 10.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16, and the link local network
169.254.0.0/16 among others.

CAUTION: Setting this parameter could have serious security
implications and should only be use for testing.

-- x5u_acl ------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than providing individual permit/deny parameters, you can set
the acllist parameter to an acl list predefined in acl.conf.

Default: none

CAUTION: Setting this parameter could have serious security
implications and should only be use for testing.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Example "verification" object:
--;

;[verification]
;global_disable = yes
;load_system_certs = no
;ca_path = /var/lib/asterisk/keys/stir_shaken/verification_ca
;cert_cache_dir = /var/lib/asterisk/keys/stir_shaken/verification_cache
;failure_action = reject_request
;curl_timeout=5
;max_iat_age=60
;max_date_header_age=60
;max_cache_entry_age = 300
; For internal testing
;x5u_deny=0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0
;x5u_permit=127.0.0.0/8
;x5u_permit=192.168.100.0/24
;relax_x5u_port_scheme_restrictions = yes
;relax_x5u_path_restrictions = yes

;--
=======================================================================
  Profile Object Description
=======================================================================
A "profile" object can be associated to channel driver endpoint
(currently only chan_pjsip) and can set verification and attestation
parameters specific to endpoints using this profile.  If you have
multiple upstream providers, this is the place to set parameters
specific to them.

The "id" of this object is arbitrary and you'd specify it in the
"stir_shaken_profile" parameter of the endpoint.

Parameters:

-- type (required) ----------------------------------------------------
Must be set to "profile"

Default: none

-- endpoint_behavior--------------------------------------------------
Actions to be performed for endpoints referencing this profile.
Must be one of:
- off -
  Don't do any STIR/SHAKEN processing.
- attest -
  Attest on outgoing calls.
- verify
  Verify incoming calls.
- on -
  Attest outgoing calls and verify incoming calls.
Default: off

All of the "verification" parameters defined above can be set on a profile
with the exception of 'global_disable'.

All of the "attestation" parameters defined above can be set on a profile
with the exception of 'global_disable'.

When Asterisk loads the configs, it creates "effective profiles" or
"eprofiles" on the fly that are the amalgamation of the attestation,
verification and profile. You can see them in the CLI with
"stir_shaken show eprofiles".

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Example "profile" object:
--;

;[myprofile]
;type = profile
;endpoint_behavior = verify
;failure_action = continue_return_reason
;x5u_acl = myacllist

;In pjsip.conf...
;[myendpoint]
;type = endpoint
;stir_shaken_profile = myprofile

;In acl.conf...
;[myacllist]
;permit=0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0
;deny=10.24.20.171

